

THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE COLD WAR:
TOWARDS COMMON FOREIGN & SECURITY POLICY

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
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**THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE COLD WAR:
TOWARDS COMMON FOREIGN & SECURITY POLICY**

Robert K. Rizzo

**Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
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Roy Gardner Ph.D.


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Moureen Coulter, Ph.D.

DEDICATION

For my family

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RKR
Bloomington, Indiana
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Abbreviations & Acronyms




ACA	Agency for the Control of Armaments
BTO	Brussels Treaty Organization
CEEC	Central and East European Countries
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EUROCORPS	European Corps
EUROFOR	European Forces
EUROMARFOR	European Marine Forces
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to WEU

FTA	Free Trade Area
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IRF	Immediate Reaction Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NTA	New Transatlantic Agenda
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SAC	Standing Armaments Committee
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SEA	Single European Act
SEM	Single European Market
SDI	Strategic defence initiative
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union

Map 1¹



¹ Northcott, Jim, *The Future of Britain and Europe*. Policy Studies Institute Publishing, London, 1995, p 8.



² Northcott, p 9



Introduction

It is a time of great change and transition in Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990's set into motion a series of events that could only be imagined twenty years ago. Today we see a united Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe moving rapidly towards democratic governments, demand economies and closer political, economic and social ties with the West. In the midst of these significant events the European Union (EU) and its fifteen member countries stand at an important juncture in the development of common foreign and security policy.

The subject of my thesis is the European Union and formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The questions I will try to answer are: One, what must the EU do in order to establish a viable CFSP? Two, does the EU need a military component to enforce its CFSP once achieved? This discussion is important for two reasons. First, the European Union is in a position to take on a significant role in maintaining peace in the world as well

as meeting its own security challenges, if it can agree on common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Second, if the EU cannot agree on CFSP and its implementation then the EU may remain on the back burner. Meanwhile organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) will maintain peace and security in Europe and the world.

The thesis is organized into four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one will be an overview of the history of European security to set the stage for later chapters. It will focus on defense organizations and their changing roles from the end of World War II through the Cold War to the present. Chapter two will cover current security organizations (including structure and military forces), and the missions and functions they perform. Chapter three will discuss CFSP; what it is, attempts at formulation, and EU efforts towards developing and implementing it. Two significant problems in establishing CFSP are unanimous versus majority voting and Member States remaining united once a decision has been made. In particular the United Kingdom strongly opposes giving up any national sovereignty in the area of defense to a supranational body like the EU. Finally, chapter four will look to the future of EU

security and address several questions. New threats to security have replaced those of the cold war. The EU, the Western European Union (WEU), and NATO must reorganize to meet these new security challenges. How will each organization develop as they address the future? The EU and NATO are expanding. What will be the effect on the EU's CFSP? Finally, as the EU expands and develops a CFSP the United States and the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) will have a significant impact on its development. How the EU adapts CFSP development in light of this has important implications for emerging security policies. In my conclusion I will provide an assessment of current EU progress towards achieving common foreign and security policy and the integration of current defense institutions that serve Europe and the EU.



Chapter 1

European Security: 1945 to the Present

- ❖ Origins
- ❖ European Security

'Those unwilling to undertake anything because they had no guarantee that things would turn out as they had planned were doomed to paralysis. No one today can predict the shape of the Europe of tomorrow, for it is impossible to foretell what changes will be begotten by change...The path ahead must be opened up a day at a time, the most important thing being to have an objective clear enough not to be lost sight of.'

Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*

When hostilities ended in Europe in 1945, much of the continent lay in ruins. Mass aerial bombing, a new innovation, was effective not only in killing soldiers and civilians but also in destroying communications systems, roads, bridges and buildings. Millions of refugees wandered about Europe trying to get back home. Meanwhile there was great danger of famine as food supplies ran low. Germany, once the center of European power, had ceased to exist as a viable country. Germany's bid for greater power had again devastated the European continent.

ORIGINS

In the years following the war, there were many people who believed that future war on the European continent could be prevented through closer economic and political ties. From 1945 to 1993, economic and security organizations would be formed with disparate goals except for one, securing peace in Europe.

Winston Churchill called for a "kind of United States of Europe."¹ Others such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman believed in a unified Europe, and both men would come to play important roles in Europe's future. Jean Monnet, a French economist and statesman, was a great promoter of European unification. Although Monnet was not a politician, he had worked in political circles and knew personally many of the political leaders in both Europe and the United States.

The advantages of a unified Europe were clear to him as he spoke to skeptics and supporters alike. Monnet believed that a unified Europe could enjoy similar benefits as the United States: free trade, freer cultural exchange, democracy, and an end to endemic warfare.

¹ Collins, Michael, J., *Western European Integration: Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy*. Praeger, New York, 1992, p 10.

In 1945, the United Nations (UN), a successor to the League of Nations, was founded in San Francisco, with its charter signed by fifty-one countries. Its goal was and still is to promote peace and international cooperation.

In December 1947, a Congress of Europe met in an attempt to achieve greater European cooperation. It met at The Hague and was attended by representatives of sixteen countries. Later came the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948 and the Council of Europe in May 1949. The OEEC would become the agency to administer Marshall Plan funds, while the goal of the Council of Europe was aimed at improving international cooperation among the West European states. These groups were effective in Europe's economic recovery but did little to foster greater political cooperation, unification or federation. This lack of cooperation was due mainly to British resistance to the idea of unification and reluctance to give up any national sovereignty.

Meanwhile security arrangements between France and Britain were underway. In March 1947, France and Britain signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. The treaty's purpose was primarily defense against any future German aggression. In 1948, two events would serve further to unite Europe. In

March, the Communists took control of Czechoslovakia, and in April, the Berlin blockade began. The threat was no longer Germany, but the Soviet Union.

In May 1948, France and Britain joined with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), also called the Western Union. The Organization formed a fifty-year alliance to come to the aid of each other in the event of aggression towards one of the members. It was also a diplomatic tool to further unite Europe. The BTO would also come to play an important role in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). One month later, in June 1948, the United States passed the Vandenberg Resolution authorizing alliances outside the American continent in peacetime. The United States commitment to European security arrived with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. in April 1949. The treaty is composed of a preamble and fourteen articles. The Atlantic alliance thus formed included ten European countries² plus the United States and Canada.

² Original members; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States. Greece and Turkey admitted in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

NATO's purpose was simple -- to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance member.³

With United States involvement in European defense and firm commitments from the ten European countries and Canada, immediate security concerns were satisfied.

Monnet, however, was not satisfied with progress towards unifying Europe. He saw an opportunity to move towards unification in the coal and steel industry. France had most of the iron ore and Germany had most of the coal. These natural resources and their locations had been an underlying problem in Franco-German relations and had led to many quarrels. From Monnet's vision came the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). With the help of Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, they developed a supranational body. Its purpose was to control all aspects of the coal and steel industry of the six member countries including all mining, production, transportation, pricing, and wages. This was an important first step in the unification of Europe, because it created a common interest among several European countries.

³ Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, *Fact Sheet: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, May 1997.

Monnet tried to persuade the British to join the ECSC, but he was unsuccessful. His argument was:

"The Schuman proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing.... Cooperation between nations, while essential, cannot alone meet our problem. What must be sought is a fusion of the interests of the European peoples and not merely another effort to maintain an equilibrium of those interests through additional machinery for negotiations....The Schuman proposals provide a basis for the building of a new Europe...the indispensable first principle of these proposals is the abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive field."⁴

The British refusal to join the ECSC was disappointing for Monnet; however, it did draw the six signatory countries closer together. After working out the details, the Treaty of Paris was signed on April 18, 1951, by representatives of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The ECSC would prove to be successful in achieving its goals of a more efficient coal and steel industry, promoting regional economic growth and fostering greater economic cooperation among the six signatories to this day.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

Although West European economic cooperation was increasing among the members of the ECSC, a European security agreement was still needed. Both the title and

⁴ Collins, p 15

the preamble of the Brussels Treaty addressed the issue of collective self-defense, but little progress had actually been made. In 1953, there was an attempt to establish a European security structure by combining the security dimension of the Brussels Treaty with the supranational structure of the ECSC. It was called the European Defense Community (EDC) and would have provided for a joint European military establishment. In conjunction with the EDC, there was an attempt to further political integration via the European Political Community (EPC) with competencies in the fields of economics, foreign relations, and security policies. Both initiatives failed. In 1954, Great Britain refused to join and the French National Assembly voted to move on to other issues rather than approve the EDC.

From the failure of the EDC came the Paris Agreements of 1954. The agreements expanded the Brussels Treaty Organization to allow Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to join, thereby creating the Western European Union. The cornerstone of the modified Brussels Treaty is Article V, which specifies that:

"If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

The founding of the WEU was important for several reasons. First, it was the first time that Great Britain agreed to join any sort of European security arrangement. Great Britain agreed to maintain four army divisions and an air force element on the continent. These forces could not be withdrawn unless a majority of WEU members agreed. Second, because of Great Britain's commitment to West European security, Western Europe reached a new level of integration. Until joining the WEU, Great Britain had always been involved in but apart from the continent. As Winston Churchill stated in 1953, "We are with them but not of them."⁵ Great Britain's commitment to the WEU greatly strengthened the European pillar of NATO. Third, the WEU called for unity and progressive integration of Europe.

Finally, the Brussels Treaty was significant because it formed a defensive alliance that was far more binding than that of NATO, because it commits forces of the member countries unconditionally in the event of an attack upon a member.

⁵ Ibid., p 12

Soon after World War Two, many Europeanists wanted a security structure independent of the United States. It was believed that the U.S. would soon withdraw its forces from the continent. General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), spoke of U.S. forces remaining in Europe for "seven or eight years."⁶ The WEU therefore provided Western Europe with an organization that was totally European, had military forces, and established another avenue for continuing the process of European security and integration.

The WEU, however, was never completely successful as a vehicle for furthering a European security dimension. The WEU had a few accomplishments (German admission to NATO, resolution of the Saar problem, and a link between the UK and the ECSC), but in reality it was overshadowed by NATO and was eventually relegated to carrying out routine operations under the NATO umbrella. It was not until the mid-1980's, when the WEU became the focus of new efforts towards European defense cooperation, that the WEU would play a significant role.⁷

⁶ Ibid., p 48

⁷ Baun, Michael, J., *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1996, p 84.

The Cold War

When post-World War Two security organizations were established, the perceived threat was Germany. Efforts to maintain peace were focused on keeping Germany in military check and forming alliances in the event Germany had to be controlled once again. However, it soon became apparent that Germany, while a potential future threat, was not the only threat.

Walter Lippmann first used the term "cold war" in 1947 in his book by the same name, but intense diplomatic struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union had begun as World War Two was ending. Although the Soviet Union fought on the side of the Allies, it was an uncomfortable and fragile alliance. Neither side completely trusted the other. When Germany surrendered in May 1945, Russian forces were already firmly established in Berlin. This was the first of many moves that would dissolve any remaining trust between the Soviet Union and the West. Stalin would later use the Soviet Army to occupy and control much of Eastern Europe in order to secure a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West.

A series of moves and countermoves occurred over the next several years that created an ever-increasing strain

on East-West relations. Stalin had agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran by 2 March 1946, but in November Soviet forces remained in Iran, provoking anti-Iranian sentiment in an attempt to bring Iran under Soviet influence. From Turkey, Stalin demanded its eastern provinces and the Turkish Straits. These moves by Stalin to expand his influence served further to divide the former allies and led to formulation of the Truman doctrine in 1947. The latter had two objectives: to send U.S. money to aid Turkey and Greece in combating communism and to foster an American consensus about the necessity of fighting the cold war.

One year later, in 1948, the United States launched the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program. The program made available thirteen billion dollars to rebuild Europe. Stalin refused any aid and responded by further expanding his control over Eastern Europe and threatening Western control of Germany.

While Europe was busy recovering from the devastation of World War Two, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the driving forces in world events. It was not until the mid-1980's that Europe began to exert itself collectively in a meaningful way. The

European people had a renewed interest in security issues, probably due to the failure of détente and rising East-West tensions. From the perceived threat of a strong Germany to the real threat from the Soviet Union, the UN, NATO and the WEU had to refocus and remain flexible in order to be viable. The security challenges facing Europe were and are addressed primarily by five organizations. Each has different charters, members and methods of maintaining peace.

Security Institutions

The United Nations

The United Nations Security Council is the UN organ responsible for peacekeeping. Endowed with emergency executive powers the UN Security Council has often sent peacekeeping forces to trouble spots in the world. In addition to its peacekeeping role, the UN was effective in easing Cold War tensions between East and West. The UN was a key player in arms control negotiations leading to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (1972 and 1979), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties concluded in 1991 and 1992. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has been able to commit more

time and effort in resolving regional conflicts. From Cambodia to the Balkans, the UN is active in many types of operations in support of peace.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

From its start in 1949 until mid-1950, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under Article V, pledged to come to the aid of any of the treaty members. There was, however, no mechanism in place for the Alliance to fulfill its pledge. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, there was renewed concern that the Soviet Union might move against a divided Germany. The NATO military command system was developed in response to this concern. NATO membership also grew, with Greece and Turkey joining in 1952 and West Germany in 1955.

As the Cold War expanded and intensified in the 1960's, NATO adopted a collective security strategy based on deterrence. Member countries maintained defensive military capabilities to deter military aggression. Conventional NATO forces were sufficient in a defensive role but the real deterrent power came from the nuclear superiority of the United States.

In 1967, NATO conducted a comprehensive review of its strategy. The result was a revised strategy of balanced

response, both conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. The review also realized that a common European defense should consider not only a massive Soviet attack but also more limited forms of aggression. The 1970's began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), but by the late 1970's, the Soviet Union had built up its military arsenal. When the Soviets deployed new mobile theater missiles (SS-20s) in 1979, NATO again assessed its strategy of deterrence. A strategy was adopted to pursue arms control negotiations together with responding to the new threat. The response was deploying U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in 1987 eliminated all Soviet and U.S. land-based, intermediate-range missiles. NATO again reevaluated policy and developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament". The concept provided a "framework for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control and tied defense policies to progress in arms control."⁸

⁸ Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. *Fact Sheet: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 9 May 1997.

As the Cold War drew to a close in 1989, NATO had to adapt to the fundamental political changes that were taking place in Europe. In July 1990, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) met in London and issued the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance." The NAC ministers pledged to develop closer political and military ties with Moscow and Eastern European countries. The NAC met again in November 1991 and outlined the "New Strategic Concept" that dismissed the old threat of a massive Soviet attack and recognized new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and sabotage. It was also during this summit that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established. Its purpose was to provide a forum for consultations between NATO members, East European nations, and the former Soviet republics. There are currently forty NACC members, including all sixteen NATO member countries. Further progress towards better understanding and cooperation between East and West was achieved during the 1994 NATO summit with "Partnership for Peace" (PfP). Partnership for Peace was an U.S. initiative to establish stronger links between NATO, former Soviet bloc countries

and neutral countries. Currently twenty-seven countries have joined PfP (Appendix IV, PfP Members).

The June 1996 NAC summit produced an agreement that continues the process of post-Cold War adaptation. The agreement has three components; restructuring NATO's military commands, building a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, and implementing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. NATO continues to revise and develop new policies in order to remain a viable security organization in the face of great political change and security challenges.

Western European Union

The achievements of the WEU must have been at first encouraging and later disappointing for those who had high hopes for the new organization. Between 1954 and 1973, the WEU had three significant achievements. First, the enlargement of the WEU enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to join NATO. Second, the Saar problem between France and Germany was resolved. The WEU organized a referendum for the Saarlanders to decide the fate of their territory. Third, prior to the European Economic Community expansion in 1973, the WEU was the only forum available to the United Kingdom to meet with the members of the ECSC.

Despite these successes, the WEU was unable to move towards its primary mission of developing a European security policy. Attempts to formulate a satisfactory arrangement were unacceptable to three members: Ireland, Denmark and Greece.⁹ Resistance to relinquishing more national sovereignty was too strong. When the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973, the WEU lost its remaining significant role in European affairs. There were no meetings at ministerial level from 1973 to 1984. In 1983 the United States launched its 'Star Wars' program without consulting Europe. This resulted in a desire for a stronger European security agreement.

In 1980 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to save its Marxist regime, détente was over. As the Cold War geared up for another round, Washington and Europe had different ideas about the common security of Europe. There was also more political and popular interest in European security issues as well as a desire for more autonomy in East-West relations. There was a feeling among Europeans that the United States government was excessively influencing their defense arrangements and that more European control was needed.

⁹ Cahen, Alfred, *The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defense Identity within*

The rebirth of WEU came in October 1984 during a meeting of the Foreign Defense Ministers in Rome. In the Rome Declaration, the ministers stressed their commitment to the goals of WEU:

- To strengthen peace and security,
- To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe,
- To cooperate more closely both among member States and with other European organizations.¹⁰

New measures were discussed on how to achieve the elusive goal of developing a European security arrangement. Many plans were proposed; however, even the most promising plans were only partially successful. Within the framework of European Political Co-operation (EPC) the British proposed competence in the field of security. What emerged was competence to deal only with the political aspects of security.

The Single European Act (SEA) of December 1985 also attempted but failed to gain a commitment to a European security agreement. The continual failure to get European security off the ground prompted the Seven¹¹ to turn to the

the Context of Atlantic Solidarity. Brassey's, 1989, p 12.

¹⁰ The Rome Declaration 26-27 October 1984.

¹¹ Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom.

WEU. A European security agreement would continue to prove illusive, much as it is today.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe & the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe can be traced back to Joseph Tito (president of Yugoslavia) in 1944 and Vyacheslav Molotov (foreign minister of the Soviet Union) in 1953, who both suggested the need for a European security conference. Their aim was to develop greater cooperation throughout all of Europe. Tito and Molotov continued urging a conference. After several years of trying to convince the West to take part in this endeavor, the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in 1972. Held in Helsinki, it established agreements among thirty-three and later thirty-five states to enter into multilateral consultations. Preparations were also made for a Geneva conference in 1973. The Geneva conference concluded with the "Blue Book", which outlined final recommendations for the scope and rules of procedure for future conferences. The conference of 1975 held in Helsinki produced the "Helsinki Final Act". The agreements of the Act are politically if not legally binding and are divided into three main categories or "baskets". Basket one concerns

questions relating to European Security. Basket two covers cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment. Basket three covers cooperation in humanitarian and related issues. During the Cold War, the CSCE provided a forum for East-West relations and was successful in several areas:

- Establishing standards in interstate relations,
- Aiding East European countries in forming stronger ties to the West,
- Negotiating the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)¹² where the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations had failed and,
- Establishing favorable conditions between East and West when the Cold War ended.

Post-Cold War political conditions led to the institutionalization of the CSCE. During the Paris conference in 1990, the Conference established permanent institutional bodies: the Senior Council (Prague), the Permanent Council (Vienna), and the Parliamentary Assembly (Copenhagen). In 1994 the Conference name was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

¹² The CFE limits non-nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.

Since the end of the Cold War, the CSCE/OSCE has modified its charter and mission to focus on conflict prevention and crisis management.

The European Union

The European Coal and Steel Community established in 1951 was the beginning of the journey towards greater European integration. The success of the ECSC and the pressures of the Cold War led to initiatives in defense and political union. ECSC members first moved toward economic cooperation. The next step was the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by the six ECSC members. On 25 March, 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) on a supranational basis. The treaty extended the common market for coal and steel to all economic sectors in the member countries. It also "set up institutions and decision-making mechanisms through which both national interests and a Community view could find their expression. From that time onwards, the European Community was the major axis round which the movement for a united Europe turned".¹³

The United Kingdom, always wary of giving up

¹³ Fontaine, Pascal, *Seven Key Days in the Making of Europe*. Institute of Political Studies, Paris, 1996, p 2.

sovereignty to a supranational body, chose not to join the ECSC or the EEC and formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 with six other countries. The Association, which included the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, restricted itself to the elimination of tariffs on industrial products among its members. The economic success of the EEC in the 1960's prompted Great Britain to abandon EFTA in 1961 and apply for membership in the EEC. French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the British initiative, however, and it was not until 1973 that Great Britain joined the Community (along with Denmark and Ireland). Greece joined in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1991 bringing the total to fifteen countries.

In 1967, the EEC evolved into the European Community (EC). The EC's legal foundation consists of the treaties of the ECSC, the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community¹⁴ (EAEC) or Euratom. Legally these three communities exist separately, but politically they are considered one community. The distinction between the EEC

¹⁴ Euratom, established in 1968 has the following tasks; developing research, dispersing knowledge and making investments.

and the EC was that each country has given up some national sovereignty in order to form a cohesive and strong political unit. The EC in effect has a sovereignty of its own and the force of national law. During the 1970's, efforts to coordinate national policies continued. The first such instrument was European Political Cooperation (EPC) set up in 1970. Its purpose is, as the name implies, to act as an instrument to aid in voluntary foreign policy coordination.

The next significant move towards European integration was the signing of the Single European Act. The Act, which entered into force on 1 July, 1987, had three main objectives: the creation of a European Union; the establishment of a single market by 1992 and closer policy cooperation on the environment, research and technology; and foreign policy cooperation. As progress towards the goals of the SEA continued, two intergovernmental conferences were held in December 1990. The first conference was concerned with planning for economic and monetary union while the second was responsible for addressing the problems of political union. The result of the conferences was the Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed by the member states in Maastricht on 7 February

1992. After being ratified by member states, the Treaty took force on 1 November 1993. In the area of security, the treaty details the procedures for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) that will lead to a common defense policy. However the EU has much work to do in order to achieve the goal of CFSP and common defense.

SUMMARY

For the past forty-six years, from the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community to the establishment of the European Union, the overriding objective of European integration has been to maintain peace. Robert Schuman believed that by binding European countries together economically, war between them would become far less likely. The European Union and the many organizations that have made the EU a reality have made great economic progress. The security organizations of the EU, while accomplishing a great deal, have fallen short in establishing a common foreign and security policy. The issue of security is a sensitive one and difficult to resolve. The nub of the problem is the necessity of giving up some national sovereignty to a supranational body. There are currently five main organizations that are involved in European security: the UN, NATO, WEU, OSCE and

the EU. The purpose, structure, and relationships among these organizations with regard to the security of the European Union are the subjects of the next chapter.



Chapter 2 Current Military & Security Organizations

❖ The UN, WEU, NATO, OSCE, EU

"Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minutes warning."

Major Robert Rogers, Standing Orders, 1759¹

Although the Cold War is considered over, security remains vital. With the hold of socialist regimes broken, conflicts have erupted that threaten to disrupt economies and cause instability. The conflict in the Balkans is a constant reminder of Europe's inability to meet the new security challenges facing it and the world.

All five institutions (UN, WEU, NATO, OSCE, EU), whether political or military or political/military in nature, have missions and organizations to address the challenges of maintaining security for Europe and the European theater.

¹ Major Rogers organized the first Rangers in 1756 to fight for the British during the French and Indian Wars.

European leaders are in the midst of sorting out who is responsible for what in trying to adapt to a changing Europe.

Each institution that currently plays a part in Europe's security architecture has a unique quality that adds strength to the whole structure. What must be sorted out are the specific tasks and missions of each, so that they are working in harmony and not discord towards a common goal.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Organization

The United Nations is the largest of the organizations with 185 member states. It is an organization of sovereign nations in the pursuit of world peace and stability. Each member regardless of size or economic power has a voice and a vote in the policies set forth by the organization. Under Article Four of the Charter of the UN, membership is "open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."² For the organizations discussed

² Charter of the United Nations, Chapter II, Membership.

here, the UN is important because it is the foundation with which the remaining organizations seek to comply.

The UN has six main organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. The General Assembly and the Security Council are by virtue of the UN Charter responsible for peace and security. The Secretary General of the Assembly is also an important figure in maintaining peace.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly is the main deliberative body. Each of the 185 member states is represented and has one vote. Much like a parliament, simple matters require a majority vote while more serious questions require a two-thirds majority vote. Once a decision is made, the Assembly has no power to compel any state to act other than the pressure of world opinion. The Assembly also performs the following functions:

- Sets policies and determines programs for the UN Secretariat,
- Directs activities for development,
- Approves the UN budget, including peacekeeping operations,

- Receives reports from other organs, admits new members and appoints the UN Secretary General.

The Secretary General presides over and is appointed by the Assembly. The Secretary General plays a central role in securing and maintaining peace. The Secretary General may initiate fact-finding missions and appoint special committees in order to determine if peace is threatened. The Secretary also has the authority to bring to the attention of the Security Council concerns or violations that threaten peace and international security.

The Security Council

While the General Assembly and the Security Council interact on issues of peace and security, the primary organ for the day-to-day mission of peace and security is the Security Council. The Council has fifteen members, five of which are permanent: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Assembly elects the other ten members for two-year terms. Ordinary decisions require nine votes, and decisions cannot be taken if a permanent member casts a veto.

When a problem arises between member states, they may bring the dispute before the Council for a decision. Unlike the Assembly, when the Council makes a decision the

member state or states are obligated to comply. To back up the decision the Council may impose economic sanctions or order collective military action. Other options available to the Council are:

- Mediation between opposing parties,
- Deploying peace-keepers to prevent a conflict, reduce tensions or keep opposing forces apart,
- In the event of hostilities, securing a cease-fire.

Military Forces

Forces available to the Council for UN peacekeeping operations come from member states that voluntarily provide troops and equipment. Force size and composition depend on the world situation and ongoing UN operations. In 1996 for example, 26,300 UN troops, military observers, and civilian police from seventy countries were deployed to seventeen operations around the world.³

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are the primary military actions performed by the UN. These operations include implementing peace agreements, monitoring cease-fires, patrolling demilitarized zones, creating buffer zones between opposing forces, and delaying fighting during peace negotiations. Recent examples are the UN missions in

³ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The UN in Brief*. July 1996, p 10.

Croatia and Macedonia. Peace enforcement operations are employed less frequently. While peacekeeping operations are conducted with the consent of the opposing groups, peace enforcement operations can be carried out without consent. Member states are given authorization to take all necessary measures to achieve the stated goal. The Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are examples of peace enforcement operations.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Organization

The Western European Union has, since the 1980's, been revived and named as the organization to act as a link between the political goals of the European Union and the security objectives of NATO. Article J.4, paragraph 2 states, "The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements."⁴ The WEU is also the only multilateral organization where foreign and defense ministers meet together on a regular basis. The WEU is

⁴ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J4.

therefore well suited to combine the military assets available to the WEU with the political objectives of the EU.

The WEU has three organizational arms established by the Modified Brussels Treaty: the Council of Ministers, the Permanent Council, and the Parliamentary Assembly. Since October 1984 and The Rome Declaration the Ministers have reinforced their commitment to work towards achieving the goals of:

- Further integrating Europe,
- Maintaining the Atlantic Alliance,
- Strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance,
- Providing a forum for discussion of key European security interests.

There are four types of WEU membership. In order of commitment they are full members, associate members, observers, and associate partners. Associate members commit military forces to WEU operations and participate as full members in planning operations. Observers must have the agreement of all the full members to participate in a WEU operation. Associate partners also participate with the consent of the full members and commit appropriate forces. There are currently ten WEU members, five

observers, three associate members, and nine associate partners (see appendix II).

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is made up of foreign and defense ministers from the twenty-seven member countries. The Ministers meet a minimum of twice a year and when world or European events dictate. The Council provides guidance to and hands down decisions for action by the Permanent Council.

The Permanent Council

The Council of WEU was created in 1954 under the Brussels Treaty and later amended by Article VII of the Brussels Treaty. The Council's task is the execution of the Treaty, its protocols, and annexes. It also carries out the decisions of the Ministers. The Council decides on the organization of its work and can set up additional bodies to accomplish its goals. It is a decision-making body via voting procedures as opposed to the consultative nature of the Council during the Brussels Treaty Organization. Each member country holds the Presidency for a one-year term. Full Members of the WEU make up the Council.

The Assembly

When the Assembly was first formed under protocol to the Brussels Treaty, there was very little guidance given. The only requirement of the Assembly was to discuss an annual report from the Council on its activities and "in particular concerning the control of armaments." The Assembly therefore began work on a charter to expand its role and power in WEU. The Assembly presented a draft charter that was not completely acceptable to the Council. In particular, the Council did not approve of the term "Charter" which "smacked of Runnymede and the restoration of the Bourbons."⁵ The Council also rejected the proposal that the Assembly could adopt a "vote of general disagreement" with the Council. After some haggling with the Council over these and other points, members agreed on several issues. The Assembly:

- Is consultative in nature,
- Has no power to overthrow the executive organ,
- Can adopt a motion to disagree with the Report of the Council.

⁵ Robertson, A. H., *European Institutions: Cooperation, Integration, Unification*. The London Institute of World Affairs, London, 1973, p 136.

Military Forces

WEU military organization is such that it allows for diverse responses to its own or outside crisis or requests. Military forces can be employed in response to crisis on its own initiative or at the request of the EU or NATO. At the Petersberg Ministerial meeting in 1992, WEU outlined the missions for which their forces could be employed:

- Humanitarian and rescue,
- Peacekeeping operations,
- Crisis management including peacemaking.

Missions are initiated in response to a crisis either collectively or individually. In most cases, assistance from other countries is called for and a coalition will be formed to meet the demands of the crisis. Because WEU missions are sometimes conducted with NATO, procedures fall in line with those established and practiced by NATO forces.

Depending on the crisis and the situation, responsibility for the operation can be held by a "lead nation" or by the WEU. If a nation assumes a leadership role in the operation, the WEU can provide political support by coordinating contributions to the operation. If the operation is in response to a request from the EU, the

EU can apply political, economic and financial pressure in conjunction with military force from WEU.

The organization of the WEU has developed in response to the many types of missions it must potentially fill. In 1992, a Planning Cell was established as a result of the Petersberg Declaration to plan for WEU operations. The Cell's purpose is to speed up the WEU's decision-making process and its ability to conduct missions. Another important task for the Planning Cell is maintaining and updating the list of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). The FAWEU include Full and Associate Members of WEU. Military resources from Member States, and Associate Member States including national forces are:

- The European Corps: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain,
- The Multinational Division Central: Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, UK (including the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force),
- EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR⁶: France, Italy, Portugal and Spain,
- Franco/UK European Air Group: France and UK.

⁶ European Force (EUROFOR) and European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR).

Efforts are also underway between WEU and NATO to determine the composition and command structure of NATO forces that will be available to WEU. By sharing the forces available, both WEU and NATO can avoid the expense of duplication of forces. The NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept is part of this effort and will be discussed in the next section.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Organization

There is much agreement from both sides of the Atlantic that NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of European security. Just as the EU is dependent on WEU for defense, the same can be said for WEU's reliance on NATO for conventional forces and nuclear security. Current NATO structure includes seven major organs:

North Atlantic Council (NAC), the principal forum for NATO members on matters of their common security,

North Atlantic Council/Defense Ministers (NAC/D), concerned with overall issues of defense,

Defense Planning Committee (DPC), defense planning and all matters relating to the integrated military structure (France withdrew from the DPC in 1966)

Nuclear Planning Group, authority for all nuclear matters (France does not participate, Iceland is an observer),

Military Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of each country (Iceland has no military forces and is represented by a civilian), advises the NAC and DPC on military matters and provides guidance to the NATO commanders,

Regional Commands, Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) cover the strategic areas of member countries,

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), established to form greater ties with former Warsaw Pact states. Current members include the sixteen NATO countries⁷, eight Central European states, the twelve former Soviet republics, and three Baltic States⁸.

NATO Adaptation

NATO has from its inception been a political and military alliance. Now with the Cold War over, NATO is adapting to new threats and security challenges to the Alliance. Measures are underway to continue the process of

⁷ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, The United Kingdom, The United States.

⁸ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Austria, Finland, Malta and Sweden have observer status as participants in PfP.

adaptation. NATO's new Strategic Concept, introduced at the Rome Summit in November 1991 detailed the missions that NATO forces will undertake. In addition to defending the security and territorial integrity of member states, new missions include crisis management and prevention operations, including peacekeeping. Alliance leaders continue the process of NATO adaptation by revising force and command structures. At the June 1996 North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting, the Ministers agreed on three measures designed to further the process of NATO adaptation:

- Restructuring NATO's military commands,
- Building a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and
- Implementing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.

The principal feature of restructuring military commands is a reduction of Major NATO Commands from three to two. The remaining commands are Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) was disbanded on 1 June, 1994, and absorbed by Allied Command Europe.

ESDI is currently being developed within the Alliance. Once in place, ESDI would maintain military forces under the political control of the WEU. This arrangement would allow the WEU to draw on NATO assets and avoid duplication of resources.

The Military Committee is in charge of further development of CJTF and is closely linked to ESDI. The Concept of CJTF would create a "separable but not separate" European force structure by making NATO's multinational forces available for wider NATO operations or use by the WEU. NATO and WEU leaders are still working out the CJTF details.

Two additional adaptive measures that should be mentioned are Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Eurocorps. The PfP program is another important adaptation measure for NATO. Twenty-seven countries⁹ have joined PfP. PfP grew from the successes of the NACC in fostering greater political and military cooperation with Eastern European countries. The objectives of the Partnership are:

- "Facilitating transparency in national defence
- planning and budgeting processes,
- Ensuring democratic control of defence forces,

⁹ Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

- Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE,
- Developing cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed,
- Developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance."¹⁰

The partnership offers member countries the opportunity to strengthen ties with NATO at their own pace, while increasing security and diminishing threats to peace in Europe as a whole. Thus far, PfP has been highly successful. Since 1994, there have been more than fifty joint military exercises, seminars, and workshops.

Eurocorps became operational in 1994. It falls under NATO command only when the defense of NATO territory is concerned. Otherwise the Corps is expected to act outside NATO authority or when NATO has decided not to take action. Eurocorps forces are composed of one French and one German division plus contingents from Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. Eurocorps is still in its infancy, and it is uncertain what role it will fulfill in the security architecture of the future.

¹⁰ NATO Fact Sheet Number 9, *Partnership for Peace (PfP)*, March 1996.

Military Forces

NATO forces are organized into three categories: Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces. All forces, including ground, air, and maritime units, are assigned by member countries to NATO Command authority. The reaction forces are maintained at a high state of readiness to respond to a crisis. These forces are chosen based on their high levels of tactical proficiency. Reaction forces are further organized into the Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). As the names imply, the IRF is the first to be deployed in a crisis followed by the RRF. Meanwhile the Main Defense Forces would be alerted and begin preparing for deployment if necessary. Main defense forces form the bulk of NATO's ground, air and maritime assets. Currently there are four multinational main defense corps. Eurocorps is also a contributor to these forces and could be called upon during a crisis. Augmentation forces are other units that can be employed to reinforce ongoing operations as required.

The process of NATO's adaptation continues, however NATO remains a defensive alliance under the control of the Alliance's political authorities.

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The OSCE's contribution and goals towards greater security and peace go beyond the EU to include all of Europe. The Organization offers some unique characteristics that have proven to be successful in securing and maintaining peaceful resolutions to conflicts throughout Europe. First the OSCE is the only pan-European organization that is open to all European countries from Vladivostok to London. Fifty-five nations, including the United States, Canada and Russia, participate in the OSCE (see appendix III). Second is its focus on non-military solutions to problems. The OSCE is not a legally binding treaty. It therefore can place little economic or political pressure on member states to comply with decisions. This is a feature that appeals to conflicting parties and sometimes results in greater cooperation. Third, the OSCE focuses on the human dimension of conflict resolution. Because of its limited capabilities to enforce decisions, it has focused on long term solutions to problems before they erupt into conflict.

The primary tasks of the OSCE are:

- "Conflict prevention,
- Military aspects of security,
- The human dimension,

- The economic dimension."¹¹

The OSCE has been successful in meeting these tasks in conflicts such as Chechnya and Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the conflict in Chechnya, Russia asked for and received the help of an OSCE Assistance Group. The Group acted as an intermediary and was key to helping both parties reach a settlement. During the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the OSCE was requested to supervise the preparation of free elections and to monitor the human rights situation. In both cases the OSCE played an important role by capitalizing on its unique qualities of being a non-threatening, completely European organization that focuses on the human dimension.

Organization

The primary OSCE institutions working towards greater European security are:

Summits are held every second year. Heads of State or Government of OSCE Member States attend them. Summits are the highest authority of the OSCE.

The Ministerial Council is composed of the Foreign Ministers of participating States. It meets once a year

¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Denmark, OSCE Denmark Chairman in Office 1997. Web Edition, 1997, p3.

and is the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE.

The Secretariat is responsible for day to day OSCE operations.

The Senior Council meet three times a year and is the highest administrative body of the Organization. The Council decides on general budgetary and political matters.

The Permanent Council meets weekly and members are permanent representatives of the OSCE member States. They are the regular body for political consultation and decide on all matters concerning the OSCE.

The Parliamentary Assembly meets once a year to evaluate fulfillment of OSCE goals. It also debates and makes recommendations on issues on the agenda.

The Conflict Prevention Center is responsible for early warning, conflict prevention and management as well as operational support of OSCE missions.

Although the OSCE has been an effective diplomatic instrument, it remains limited in scope because of requirement for unanimous agreement.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has been an effective and remarkable engine of greater European security. The

security it has achieved, however, is not the result of an overwhelming military presence or mastery of CFSP. It has instead come from the power of trade and cooperation. In one respect, the EU has mastered the foreign policy part of the CFSP. Using trade as a weapon of foreign policy, it has become a world trading power with a GDP that rivals that of the United States.¹²

The European Union has no dedicated military forces. In accordance with the Treaty on European Union, the EU relies on the WEU on matters of defense and security. The EU does have an important role to play in the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which could evolve into common defense policy and finally into common defense. The development and employment of CFSP has been frustrating and disappointing. Although the TEU makes provisions for CFSP, it has been less than successful in its performance thus far and is perhaps too ambitious in scope. CFSP and the EU's role in its development will be covered in greater detail in chapter three.

Organization

The European Union stands on three "pillars": the Community pillar, the Home Affairs pillar, and the Foreign

¹² Source: Eurostat, 1994 figures.

and Security Policy pillar. The Community pillar is composed of the Council of the EU and the Commission (executive branch located in Brussels), the Parliament (legislative located in Strasbourg), the European Court of Justice (judicial located in Luxembourg City), and other EC institutions. Providing guidance and direction to all three pillars is the European Council. The European Council is the supreme guiding body for the Union. It is made up of heads of government of Member States. Its role in CFSP is specified in Title V (Article J.8) of the CFSP pillar and is responsible for establishing the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP.

The Council is an intergovernmental institution composed of ministerial representatives from Member States. It is the main legislative arm of the EU and in conjunction with the EP, makes the final decision in EU law. The Council takes decisions and confers authority on the Commission to act. It is responsible for coordinating economic policies and puts European Council guidelines into effect. The Council meets in Brussels. Meetings are tailored to the topic at hand, for example agriculture or transport, and are attended by their respective ministers.

Each Member State holds the Council presidency for six months.

The Commission conducts the day-to-day operations of the EU. The Commission initiates legislation, then sends it to the Council and the Parliament, and finally ensures its implementation. It makes economic policy, manages the Union's annual budget, policies, and international trade relationships. The Commission has twenty commissioners including the President. There are two commissioners from each large country¹³ (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and one from each small country (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden). The President (currently Jacques Santer of Luxembourg until 1999) is chosen by the European Council after consulting the European Parliament, for a five-year term. The President creates and assigns nineteen commission portfolios. Each large country receives one large and one small portfolio, while each small country receives one portfolio. Commissioners are appointed by common agreement among the member states in consultation with the incoming president and approved as a body by the European Parliament. Most

¹³ Large and small countries are based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

commissioners are politicians from their home countries, however they must act in the best interests of the Union, independently of national governments.

The Parliament is the "guardian" of European interests and the defender of citizens' rights. It is the EU's only directly elected body. Its main functions and roles include:

- Legislative powers of a consultative nature without the power to initiate legislation. The EP may request the Commission to submit a proposal.
- Assent of the EP must be given before certain decisions can take effect, including accession of new members, association and cooperation agreements, and agreements with non-EU states.
- Supervisory role over the executive.
- Budgetary authority of the Community together with the Council.
- Appointment and dismissal of the Commission. The EP has powers of approval for the President of the Commission and the Commission as a whole. It also has the power to dismiss the Commission by passing a censure motion requiring a two-thirds majority vote.

The European Court of Justice is composed of two courts, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. The Court of Justice ensures uniform interpretation of Community law. It has fifteen judges and nine advocates general who are appointed by member states by common accord for a six-year term. The Court of First Instance deals with all actions brought by individuals and companies against decisions of the Community institutions and agencies. The Court has fifteen judges appointed by the Member States for a six-year term.

The Other primary EU institutions are the Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, Court of Auditors, and the European Investment Bank (see table 2.0).

SUMMARY

The security architecture of the EU and Europe is under construction. The construction however, is being done without a blueprint. Direction and focus are needed to develop a meaningful security arrangement that takes advantage of each organizations assets without duplication. The blueprint for the future security of the EU and Europe is the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The politics and difficulties of creating a CFSP are the topics of chapter three.

Table 2.0 The Main Functions and Roles of the EU Institutions¹⁴

Institution	Main Functions & Roles
Commission <i>(appointed)</i>	Policy initiation; implementation; guardian of treaties; drafting budget; monitoring; troubleshooting; external relations; 'motor' of integration
European Council <i>(heads of government of member states)</i>	Guidance and strategic direction; decision-taking
Council of the European Union <i>(ministers of member states)</i>	Main legislative and decision-taking arm; adoption of budget; external relations
European Parliament <i>(directly elected)</i>	Legislative scrutiny, amendment and (limited) 'co-decision'; assent; supervision; adoption of budget; discussion forum; redress of grievances
European Court of Justice	Judicial interpretation and enforcement
Economic & Social Committee <i>(nominated by national governments and formally appointed by the Council)</i>	Consultative assembly of representatives of employers & workers. A formal channel for providing information and advice to the Commission and the Council
Committee of the Regions <i>(members plus alternates are appointed by Member States)</i>	Advisory body established to ensure a stronger voice for the regions in the Union. It must be consulted on five policies: education, culture, public health, Trans-European networks and economic and social cohesion.
Court of Auditors <i>(each Member State proposed one member for appointment)</i>	External auditing of the Community's general budget and of the ECSC's operating budget.
European Investment Bank <i>(Board of Governors, make up of ministers of the Member States. Part-time Board of Directors nominated by the Board of Governors, plus a member from the Commission)</i>	Established to finance capital investment projects, which contribute to the balanced development, integration and economic and social cohesion of member countries.

¹⁴ Jones, Robert, A., *The Politics and Economics of the European Union: An Introductory Text*. Edward Elgar, United Kingdom, 1996, p 65.



Chapter 3 Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy

- ❖ CFSP
- ❖ The Role of the European Union

"It is deeply regrettable that any assessment of the early operations of the CFSP cannot be described as positive. Despite the lofty language in Title V of the Treaty on European Union, it is difficult to observe any significant improvement in the EU's coherence or increased influence on the world stage".

- Jacques Delors¹

The geopolitical situation in Europe has changed significantly since 1989. The events that have taken place

- the unification of Germany, the fall of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of nationalism
- have given the European Union an opportunity to lead and play a significant role in reshaping the European continent. Conversely these events have also severely tested the EU's ability to act collectively. Is the formation of a viable CFSP a requirement for assuming leadership and strengthening Europe? A poll taken in March

¹ Regelsberger, Elfriede, *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. 1997, p vii.

1996 suggests that it is. Europeans from the EU were asked in survey: "Do you think that, to make further progress in building Europe, it is necessary to have one European foreign policy?"² The figures varied for each country but seventy percent of those asked (EU wide) answered yes to the question. Three countries, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, had a higher percentage of people who answered no.

If a CFSP is required, what form should it take? Jones suggests two views of CFSP: "maximalist" and "minimalist". The maximalist view of CFSP is that of a unified, supranational foreign policy. This would lead to an EU Foreign Ministry with its own defense forces under a single command. The minimalist view of CFSP is limited to cooperation among member states on matters of foreign and security policy. It is obvious that the EU is not ready for the maximalist view and that the minimalist view is a much more realistic approach. EU disunity during the Gulf and Balkan Crises, described later in this chapter, are clear examples that the EU has more work to do.

As the EU comes to terms with the new world order and

² European Commission, *Europe on the Move: Exploring Europe*. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996, p 78.

Cold War policies become obsolete, the 1996 IGC has the challenge of addressing many important security questions. Against the backdrop of new threats to peace and stability the IGC will discuss further CFSP development, WEU integration into the EU, and greater use of majority voting in CFSP and defense matters. Also important to any discussion on security is United States participation in Europe, NATO's role, and the impact of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) on CFSP. The answers to these questions and more were at the center of EU business at the IGC.

Arguments (see table 3.1) and discussions that surround CFSP will surely continue for many years. Meanwhile the EU has the difficult task of determining what part it will play in Europe's future, while continuing to define itself as an institution. Nowhere is the struggle of defining itself more evident than in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Table 3.1 Arguments For and Against CFSP³

For	Against
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collectively, Union countries will be able to exercise greater clout in international affairs. • The Development of the Union is creating common international interests amongst Union members. • The potential for instability in post-cold-war Europe requires a common approach. • It is a logical phase in the development of the Union. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differences in foreign policy interests, deriving from geography and history. • Foreign and security policy are core functions which governments are reluctant to relinquish. • There are major problems in coordinating foreign policy positions. • Several member states are at best lukewarm about CFSP.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Since the end of World War Two, European leaders have been trying to bring the countries of Europe closer together both economically and politically. When Schuman and Monnet proposed the ECSC, their vision went beyond economic cooperation to greater political interdependence. Still today, more than fifty years later, Europe and the EU are without a viable Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although a CFSP is called for in the Treaty on European Union, the policy remains difficult to implement. Many attempts have been made to form a CFSP; yet none have come into force that truly enable the EU speak with one voice.

³ Jones, p 261

Many European leaders, Jacques Santer, and Jacques Delors among them, have expressed disappointment in the lack of progress in developing CFSP. Santer argues that without a credible CFSP the EU cannot be considered fully developed.⁴ He also believes that an effective CFSP is a necessity for the EU to become a more significant player in international affairs. Without the full support and genuine commitment of all member states, the advantages of the Union cannot be realized.

What is CFSP? Traditionally the two policies were not lumped together but had separate objectives. Foreign policy has been "to promote the interest of a given collectivity in the universal competition for resources and influence, whereas security issues proper were felt to involve matters of vital national interest".⁵ In the context of the TEU, CFSP is treated as a single concept. "The distinction between "foreign" and "security" policy is, in practice, increasingly meaningless."⁶

The origin of current CFSP under TEU is European Political Cooperation (EPC). In a 1969 meeting of EC leaders at The Hague, greater cooperation between member

⁴ Ibid., p 259

⁵ Hayward, Jack, *Governing the New Europe*. Duke University Press, Durham, 1995, p 332.

⁶ Hayward, p 332

states was called for in the field of foreign policy. The following year, EPC was established without a treaty basis. EPC was a framework for united action in foreign policy issues focusing on intergovernmental communication, consultation, and mutually agreed-upon action, but it did not extend to military aspects of security. The EPC functioned outside EU institutions on the basis of consensus. There was no voting, and the decisions were non-binding. To improve EPC effectiveness, in 1974 a Troika was formed with the previous, current and future presidents of the EU Council. The Troika consulted on foreign security matters. EPC established a Political Committee of Political Directors in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Member States. The Single European Act of 1987 recognized EPC and resulted in the formation of an EPC Secretariat. The TEU formalized, extended, and absorbed EPC into CFSP, thus changing its name and making it part of the third pillar of the European Union.

The evaluation of EPC's performance from 1969 to 1993 is mixed. On one hand, EPC is credited with playing an important role in the EU adopting common positions regarding foreign policy issues in Middle East, Eastern Europe, and South Africa. On the other hand, EPC is

regarded as the creator of "a plethora of vaguely worded declarations (usually after key events had occurred) and little action."⁷

The latest attempt at formulating a viable CFSP falls under Title V, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article J.1.1, of the Maastricht Treaty specifies that: "The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy." Article J.1 clearly specifies CFSP objectives:

- "To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- To promote international cooperation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

These are ambitious objectives that would be difficult to accomplish in the best of circumstances. The nature of the EU, with its great national diversity combined with fifteen separate foreign policies, makes it that much more

⁷ Jones, p 262

challenging. The important question is, do the provisions for a common foreign and security policy function as expected? A look at recent history and two examples of the EU in CFSP action may help in this analysis.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the European Community (EC) acted quickly and cohesively. The EC condemned the invasion and imposed economic sanctions against Iraq. When some EC member states' embassies' electricity and water were shut off, the EC again acted as one, directing the unaffected embassies to act for the others. Up until this point, the EC had acted swiftly and spoken with one voice. Speaking with one voice was soon to end.

France Breaks Ranks

"Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action."

Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.2.1

Shortly after the EC embassy confrontations, Iraq released French hostages. The EC suspected France of conducting unilateral negotiations, but the French government claimed innocence. Regardless of the truth, doubt had been cast on France's commitment to the EC.

France continued pushing for a peaceful solution to the crisis while other members, especially the British and the Dutch, favored military action. EC tensions were furthered when France drew up a peace plan that excluded the United States from EC-Iraq negotiations. The EC rejected the plan. Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands all strongly believed that United States participation was essential to success.

EC discussions on appropriate military action against Iraq continued. As a civil institution with no military force, consensus was difficult to obtain and it could do little other than offer official endorsement of UN decisions. When UN forces were deployed to the Gulf under U.S. military leadership, France violated the TEU and pursued its own peace initiative.

Two views emerged from the EC's inability to act as one. First, that "the differences between the perceptions and national interests of the member states remained too diverse to accommodate within a single foreign policy."⁸ Second, that the machinery of the EC was inadequate for the

⁸ George, Stephen, *Politics and Policy in the European Union*. Oxford University Press, 1996, p 269.

task of effectively dealing with the crisis.⁹ Both views likely contributed however, modifying the structural problems that exist in the EC would seem to be the direction to go. Poulon and Bourantonis point out that, "A structural vacuum exists in the EC, in the absence of one institution endowed with binding power to create and implement foreign policy."¹⁰

During the crisis in Yugoslavia in June 1991, the EC again acted quickly and decisively. The EC Troika¹¹ negotiated a cease-fire, peace monitors were sent to maintain the cease-fire, and economic sanctions were imposed in November 1991. The EC (via the European Council) released a declaration in June 1991 that favored, in some form, a unified Yugoslavia.

Germany Breaks Ranks

"The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with."

Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.1.4

⁹ George, p 269

¹⁰ Ibid., p 269

¹¹ The Troika consists of the previous, current and future presidents of the Council.

By the end of 1995, Germany insisted that Croatia and Slovenia be recognized by the EC or Germany would act on its own. Recognition was given as the EC again allowed one member's national interests to override the Community's political objectives. Four months into the conflict, the UN was called in to take over the peace process. In April 1993, the EC declared that any future action would be in support of the UN. The extent of EC military participation occurred when the WEU, sent warships to the Adriatic to help enforce UN sanctions.

Jacques Delors points out that there are important lessons to be learned from the Balkan crisis and the EU's CFSP efforts. "First is the need to develop the political will to function as a coherent political actor. Second is the need to create a planning and analysis capability at the European level. Third is the need to develop a military component to support our diplomacy."¹²

What to do about the EU's limited successes and significant failures in the area of implementing a CFSP is problematic. The EU is after all a civil institution, yet its treaty calls for CFSP. The merging of the WEU with the EU is favored by many of the EU member states. Robert A.

¹² Regelsberger, p vii

Jones believes that the central issue of CFSP is that of purpose. If the EU wants to be a world superpower, then it must increase military spending, and that is unlikely to occur. The TEU specifies the principles and procedures for CFSP, yet the EU's performance during the Gulf and Yugoslav Crisis' suggest that expectations have exceeded the EU's capability to gain consensus and act as one. Clearly the EU has yet to develop an effective method of implementing CFSP. If a viable CFSP is necessary for greater EU participation in world events, then CFSP becomes even more critical to the future of the EU.

THE EUROPEAN UNION & CFSP

The purpose of the European Union in the broadest sense is "creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe".¹³ In the area of security, the Treaty on European Union states that its objective is, "To assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy." It also includes "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."¹⁴

¹³ Treaty on European Union, Title I, Article A.

¹⁴ Treaty on European Union, Title I, Article B.

While the Commission and the Parliament contribute to administering CFSP, it is the European Council or "Council" that is responsible for guiding and directing the CFSP of the EU. The Council sets the agenda on CFSP matters, defines common positions and decides on matters concerning joint actions. Significant Council decisions, including joint actions, must be taken unanimously, "except for procedural questions and in cases when, by mutual consent, a decision is taken to use qualified majority voting."¹⁵ Joint actions covered by Article J.3.6 of the TEU empower member states to act unilaterally in urgent cases. However, member states must remain faithful to the general objectives of the joint action established by the Council. Joint actions taken by the EU include humanitarian aid to Bosnia, support for the transition to democracy in South Africa, the Stability Pact in Europe, and support of the Middle East peace process.

The principle decision-making body in CFSP, as part of the Council, is the General Affairs Council, which is made up of Union foreign ministers. The General Affairs Council meets monthly and when necessary. The Council Presidency represents the EU in CFSP and is responsible for CFSP

¹⁵ Jones, p263

implementation of common measures and joint actions. Joint actions are implemented by the Presidency in association with the Commission, as assisted by the representatives of the previous and next Member State to hold the presidency. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) - senior foreign officials from member states also assists the Council in CFSP matters.

Under the TEU, the EU Commission is "fully associated" with CFSP and with the member states have the right to initiate proposals. The Commission does not, however, have the authority to monitor CFSP. The role of the EP in CFSP is for the most part advisory. The TEU requires the Council presidency to consult the EP on the "main aspects and basic choices" of CFSP and to take the EP's views into consideration. The EP must be kept informed by the Council Presidency and the Commission on CFSP issues and the EP may ask questions of and make recommendations to the Council on CFSP issues. The EP holds a debate each year to discuss and evaluate CFSP progress. The EP seeks a more significant role in CFSP. It also favors abolishing the CFSP pillar, an increase in majority voting, common embassies, and a review of EU representation on the UN Security Council. These concerns and other matters are

addressed at intergovernmental conferences (IGC's). The current IGC was convened in March 1996 in Turin, Italy and concluded in Amsterdam, June 1997. It examined a range of TEU provisions such as civil protection, energy, tourism, CFSP, and the powers of the EP. Several issues were raised concerning CFSP, most importantly the decision process and WEU integration into the EU.

Voting Practices: The Problem of Consensus

Based on reports by the IGC, there is agreement among member states, EU institutions, experts, and Europeans generally that the CFSP decision-making process is cumbersome and must be improved. In an IGC briefing in March 1997, twelve of the fifteen member states supported greater use of qualified majority voting (QVM) in some form. France and Ireland did not comment on QMV. The United Kingdom insisted that CFSP must "remain on an international footing, based on the principle of unanimity." The twelve members favoring greater use of QMV offered several voting options in the hope of avoiding deadlock situations: positive abstention, constructive abstention, consensus bar one, and opting out. All these voting methods present members with an opportunity to bow out gracefully without halting the decision-making process.

Regardless of the voting options, all twelve members favored reserving unanimity for military and security matters or issues of vital national interest.

In the same report, the EU Parliament, Commission, and Council favored using QMV in decisions relating to CFSP. The Parliament further stated that "Any Member State which is not in agreement with a common position or joint action in the areas covered by the CFSP should have a dispensation facility, but should not be able to veto the common position or joint action." An earlier report¹⁶ submitted in February 1996 by the High-Level Group of Experts also recommended that decision making be improved. The report stated that "qualified majority voting must become the rule, although the following special constraints must be acknowledged:

- A Member State's vital interests must be respected;
- No Member State can be obliged to deploy armed forces outside its territory against its will;
- The Member States with the greatest military capabilities and special political responsibility must see this reflected in the weighting of votes".

The results of "Continuous Tracking" surveys of European

¹⁶ Second Report of the High-Level Group of Experts on the CFSP led by Mr. Durieux, submitted on 28 February 1996. *European Foreign and Security Policy in the Run-up to the year 2000: Ways and Means of Establishing Genuine Credibility.*

opinion conducted by the Commission¹⁷ echo the same sentiments and illustrate the difficulty and paradox of QMV. In April 1997, sixty-six percent of Europeans polled favored more qualified majority voting, and fifty-four percent favored "increased cooperation". Only forty-five percent, however, were willing to give up their respective countries' right to veto. Hayward states that "Realism suggests that on any issue where a state (particularly a big one) feels that matters of 'sovereignty' are concerned, the unanimity rule will be applied: in other cases, consensus is likely to prevail." During the 1996 IGC, which concluded in June 1997, this is precisely what was decided. Under paragraph 2, Article 23 (formerly Article J.13), "the Council shall act by qualified majority:

- When adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy;
- When adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position."¹⁸

This is a more liberal use of majority voting compared to the TEU and is a positive move in the decision making process. It further states however that "decisions having military or defense implications" will be made by the

¹⁷ Europolinon Number 11: The Commission's survey results for February-May 1997.

¹⁸ The Amsterdam Treaty, Title V, Article 23.

Council acting unanimously. Although this remains unchanged from the TEU, paragraph 1, Article 23 provides a measure for abstention. "Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions." Article 23 continues:

"When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted."

This provision to opt out of an action is important. It allows members to remain faithful to national goals while staying committed to the EU. Perhaps the goal and necessity for the EU to speak with one voice is still within reach.

WEU Integration

The integration of the WEU into the EU has important implications for the future of CFSP: the militarization of the EU, relations with NATO, and the neutrality of some EU members. It has been noted that without a military force

to back it up, CFSP will not be truly effective. To correct this shortcoming, EU institutions, some member states, and the WEU are calling for the merger of the WEU and the EU.

The European Parliament supports the merger and recommends that "all the tasks of the WEU including the objectives of the Petersberg tasks but excluding Article V of the WEU Treaty shall be taken over by all EU Member States."¹⁹ The EU Commission also agreed with a WEU-EU merger but acknowledged that this is a long term rather than an immediate goal. The Commission further recommended that:

- The operational capabilities of the WEU include the Petersberg tasks;
- The WEU oversee, in conjunction with NATO, the territorial defense of Europe;
- The WEU adapt to the specific rules of CFSP such as opt out clauses.

Eight member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Spain) support WEU integration, while the remaining members favored an autonomous WEU. The eight members agree with the

¹⁹ Intergovernmental Conference Briefing No. 11, *WEU Security and Defense*. March 1997.

Commission's analysis that integration is not an immediate goal but that it should be achieved as soon as possible.

The other member states do agree however that the WEU and EU establish a "reinforced linkage". The WEU Assembly favors the merger but not until certain conditions are met:

- The member countries of the WEU the EU and the
- European members of NATO must be the same;
- The WEU must be fully operational.

A new European security architecture to replace the ad hoc system now in use may, in the future, be able meet the first condition. The operational status of the WEU remains in limbo until "the political ground rules in terms of the European defence identity and the Trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO, have been clarified."²⁰ In light of these requirements, the WEU Assembly has made the following recommendations:

- "The WEU is recognized as an organization authorized to act on behalf of the European Union in security and defense matters;
- Member countries of the EU which are not members of the WEU cannot block consensus within the WEU".²¹

²⁰ Second Report by the Durieux Group of Experts on the CFSP, IGC Briefing Number 11, November 1995.

²¹ Report on *The Future of European Security and the Preparation of Maastricht II*. June 1995.

With an almost equal split between support for an integrated or an autonomous WEU, and given the preconditions of the WEU Assembly, the debate will continue for some time.

SUMMARY

The security architects of Europe and the EU are in the process of further defining how they will meet the CFSP goals of the TEU. The current security system's "complex web of institutions with overlapping functions and memberships"²² (see figure 3.2) is an evolutionary patchwork that does not meet the needs of the EU. The architecture has been modified to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing Europe, but it falls short of EU's goals for CFSP. Jones suggests that there are two ways to build a security system appropriate to the post Cold War world: "existing institutions can be adapted to suit new conditions, or new 'purpose built' organizations can be created."

The future of the EU's security is being discussed and decided upon now. The EU's performance in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf was a painful way of learning that it was not ready as an institution to take on the difficult tasks that these situations demanded. In the Balkans, without

²² Jones, p 265

the backing of NATO and the United States, the fighting might have continued as the EU tried in vain to resolve the conflict. One of the most important lessons learned from the crisis in Bosnia, as Jones points out, is that "EU objectives need to be more precisely defined and matched more closely with capabilities." When the EU contributed to the Rapid Reaction Force for Bosnia, it tested and strained its ability to mobilize and deploy troops and equipment.


But even if the EU possessed a military force capable of responding to a challenge like Bosnia, the greater challenge is still speaking and acting as one. In the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, the EU could not remain unified in its efforts to bring about peace. In both cases, the national interests of one country (France in the Gulf and Germany in the Balkans) seriously damaged the EU's credibility and destroyed any possibility of achieving its objectives.

Until the EU can truly speak with one voice, the size of its military force is irrelevant, and the benefits of WEU-EU integration will not be realized. The EU must take measures to ensure that members do not continue to take unilateral actions that serve their particular interests at

the expense of collective goals. The significant problem of requiring unanimity voting is also a major hurdle to achieving an effective CFSP. But even if the question of voting is someday resolved, what will prevent a country from acting unilaterally in pursuit of its own national interests?

For the time being and probably well into the future, NATO will continue to be the primary military/political force in Europe. In the meantime, the EU must meet the greater challenge of deciding quickly on what action to take and then remaining cohesive in doing so.

Figure 3.2 Europe's Security Architecture²³



O = Observer; AM = Associate Member; AP = Associate Partner; S = Suspended

²³ Ibid., p 265



Chapter 4 The Future

- ❖ New Threats to Security
- ❖ The EU, WEU & NATO
- ❖ Enlargement: The EU & NATO
- ❖ Foreign Relations: The US & CEECs

"The effectiveness of the former Soviet armed forces has declined dramatically ... offensive capability has dramatically reduced ... A major external threat - that is, one of Cold War dimensions - is therefore ... unlikely to reemerge in the foreseeable future".

NATO Defense White Paper, 1993

The future of EU CFSP is challenging, to say the least. In the face of new and diverse threats to peace, the EU is in the midst of developing a military framework able to address them.

The EU must also begin to consider the many requests of countries that wish to join its ranks. With the conclusion of the 1996 IGC, several countries anxious to join the EU began to press hard for entry. This will have a significant impact on CFSP. While the EU was founded upon the principle of openness towards European countries, it must proceed cautiously or risk its security by changing the character of the EU.

The United States and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are also important players in European security. As the US hands over more responsibility and reduces its role, the CEECs, as eventual members of the EU will take on some of the obligation and share in strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

NEW THREATS TO SECURITY

With the threat of a massive Soviet invasion gone, what concerns now come to the forefront of an effective security arrangement? In order to meet the security requirements of the post-Cold War era, the EU must refocus its objectives in terms of the new threats that are posed. The EU must also have a military force to handle those threats. The threat of Soviet tanks poised to strike into the heart of Europe is gone; however, new threats have emerged to take its place.

Northcott outlines four main security needs that are important for the EU and Europe. They are:

1. "Avoidance of nuclear conflicts as a result of misjudgment or proliferation;
2. Defense against external attack;
3. Containment of conflicts within Europe; and
4. Contribution to resolution of conflicts in the rest of the world".¹

¹ Northcott, p 12

Nuclear Conflicts

The reduction of nuclear arms since the end of the Cold War has reduced the likelihood of an all-out nuclear war, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union has presented a new set of nuclear weapons problems. When the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan achieved independence in 1991, they also joined the ranks of countries with nuclear weapons. This had the undesirable effect of greater proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With nuclear weapons scattered around Russia and its former states during a time of tremendous social and economic changes, the potential for terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons or material becomes even greater. Although Russia supports the process of nuclear disarmament, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremist governments and terrorist groups will remain a primary concern in the coming years.

External Attack

While the threat of attack by conventional forces from anywhere is extremely remote, it is prudent for Europe to be prepared nonetheless. Reductions in US conventional forces in Europe have shifted more defense responsibility to the WEU, as it becomes a stronger European pillar of

NATO. The WEU, together with Eurocorps and CJTF's, form the manpower and structure of an evolving European/EU defensive structure. Once the details of how NATO, the EU, and the WEU will work together are completed, the European Army will be expected to complement and co-exist with national armies of Europe.

Internal Conflict

Western Europe has been at peace since the end of WWII, and there is no reason at the moment to expect that to change. Eastern Europe, however, with all that its states are going through - the absence of totalitarian governments, independence, and new economic systems - is a powder keg with many fuses. Northcott suggests several causes of instability that, in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia, have resulted in war. They are:

- "Ex-Communist leaders determined to cling to power at any cost;
- Ex-Communist institutions, officials and attitudes still holding influence;
- Unemployment, poverty, inequity and crime in the course of change to a different economic system;
- Fragile foundations to new democratic institutions, including lack of tolerance for oppositions and minorities;
- Large minorities with different cultures, languages and religions; and
- Ancient enmities expressed again after decades of suppression."²

To prevent another such occurrence, the EU must not only have to intervene quickly and decisively but also have the military force to back up its action. Additionally, any political/military action that is taken by an international institution must have the unity and political support of its member states as well as clearly defined military objectives.


Global Conflict Resolution

The ability of modern communications to bring war and crises to our living rooms and the resulting public outcry to do something has dramatically increased UN involvement throughout the world. United Nations missions have risen fourfold between 1987 and 1993 (see chart 4.0). Increased UN involvement has a great rippling effect that reaches many institutions, especially NATO, the EU, and the WEU. When the UN sets out to monitor peace arrangements or to conduct peacemaking or peacekeeping operations, it becomes a multinational, multiorganizational event. For the EU, military participation in UN operations falls to the WEU. For example, in 1992, the WEU provided naval forces to monitor compliance and enforce the embargo in the Adriatic in support of the peacekeeping mission in the former

² Northcott, p 22

Yugoslavia. For the WEU to be involved, it must be able to decide quickly and deploy a highly mobile, well-trained force under a unified command. Before the WEU deploys troops, the EU must decide what role, if any, it will play in a particular operation and how will it interact with NATO and the WEU.

Chart 4.0 Growth of UN Peacekeeping (1987-1993)³



³ Northcott, p 25

THE EU, WEU, & NATO

The CFSP of the EU needs some "teeth". If the EU is to develop a viable CFSP, or more precisely a military policy, to address current and future security concerns, what basic needs should be addressed? René Van Beveren suggests that:

"States have a common defence policy when an agreement exists on the aims of the engagement of armed forces. Various measures in preparation for that engagement can be taken, ranging from studies by military staffs to the drawing up of detailed operational plans to meet different contingencies but the engagement itself will be executed through ad hoc arrangements.

For defence to be considered "common", the states concerned must at least have a centralized military structure, which is ready to assume command of the armed forces involved in each engagement. This common defence can extend to the procurement of defence equipment and even the permanent integration of units from different nations in one command."⁴

If one agrees with Van Beveren's assessment, then the EU and the WEU need to build on two tenets: agreement on when to use armed forces and a centralized military command structure. Of the two conditions, agreement on when to use military forces is the most difficult to reach. As was demonstrated in the Balkans, it is too easy for an EU effort to be derailed by the national desires of one

⁴ Van Beveren, René, *Military Cooperation: What Structure for the Future?* Chaillot Papers, No.6, 1993, WEU, Paris.

country. One solution might be designating a person to represent the Union in security and defense matters. He or she would be under the direct authority of the Heads of State and of the Governments. This measure may aid in retaining member cohesiveness when the EU has made a decision. Another option currently under discussion is to let member states opt out of an action, allowing particular members to satisfy national demands while permitting the EU decision to go forward in unity.

The second tenet, a centralized military command, is simple to fulfill as long as the WEU can take advantage of the only organization with such a structure, NATO. A potential problem is that Americans have traditionally held many of the top NATO Regional Command positions. The NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, for example, has always been an American, although this is not a requirement. The US will likely resist changing this practice, but as Europe takes on more defense responsibilities, the US hold on such positions will weaken.

Beyond the difficulties of employing the basic tenets suggested by Van Beveren are several significant challenges that, for the EU and WEU, make them very dependent on NATO.

*The Economist*⁵ outlined six important areas that, in the absence of the Atlantic Alliance, would fall to the WEU to develop and pay for:

1. Logistics, especially air transport.
2. Intelligence gathering, including spy satellites.
3. Nuclear forces and an anti-missile defense system.
4. Computerized communications systems.
5. Ships, including transport and aircraft carriers.
6. Common standards for all weapons systems.

With the Cold War over, the cost of developing these assets would be very difficult to justify to the European people. The Royal United Services Institute in London has estimated that European countries would have to raise defense spending by 1.5% of GDP over the current 2.5% to function without NATO support.⁶ Fortunately for Europe and the EU, it is not necessary for them to strike out on their own. NATO, the EU, and the WEU are working towards a meshing of assets that will benefit all three organizations.

In the meantime, Europe is taking on more responsibility for its own defense. There are plans underway to build a "Future Large Aircraft" as well as a

⁵ *The Economist*, "The Defense of Europe". 25 February 1995.

"Euro-Frigate" program, both designed to help meet logistics requirements. Other joint European projects are the Eurofighter 2000 and the Helios I reconnaissance satellite. The Eurofighter is a joint venture between Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The first prototype was tested in 1994, and the first British and Italian squadrons will receive aircraft in 2000. The Helios I satellite program is primarily a French project, with financial help from Spain and Italy.

The benefits of these and other joint projects, in addition to boosting the European defense industry and creating technological spin-offs, are greater European cooperation and integration. This in turn may lead to a more viable CFSP. These efforts have already led Germany, France, and Great Britain to conclude that standardization and common procurement are important to European defense, and all three have agreed to be part of a European armaments agency that will coordinate weapons procurement and manufacture within the framework of the WEU.

Before tenets can be fulfilled and war-fighting capabilities put to effective use, several things need to happen. First, the EU must decide on how the WEU can best

⁶ Coffey, Peter, *Europe: Towards 2001*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, p198.

be used. Should it remain a hinge or link between NATO and the EU, or should it become completely integrated into the EU? Many European leaders strongly believe that part of the failure of CFSP thus far is due to the EU's inability to back up decisions with the threat of military action. EU/WEU integration would give the EU direct control over a military force to support its CFSP. Second, the EU must resolve the problem of decision making, specifically unanimous versus majority voting on CFSP issues. Resistance to majority voting in matters of defense still remains strong, and it will likely remain so. The immediate solution is allowing individual states to opt out of an action. Third, once the EU has decided on a course of action, it must remain unified in implementing it. To do otherwise destroys the EU's credibility as an institution and its ability to play a serious role in European and world affairs.

ENLARGEMENT: THE EU & NATO

There are many countries that wish to join the EU and NATO. As they gain members and "widen," security challenges will also increase. The prospect of an EU with double the current membership underscores the difficulties

(in population, economy, stability, diversity, and institutions) that can be expected with regard to CFSP.

The European Union

At least fifteen⁷ countries are currently seeking entry into the EU. Most of them have formally applied, but none have been admitted. This is due to an EU decision not to admit any new members until the 1996 IGC concludes (the 1996 IGC concluded in June 1997) and any changes to the treaty are considered. Under discussion are decisions on majority voting, EU enlargement, and representation of small states on the Commission. When these issues are worked out, negotiations on new membership will begin.

Although all of the countries that have applied meet the strict criteria to join - they must be European countries, multi-party or parliamentary democracies, have market-type economies, respect human rights, and have a willingness and ability to accept the obligations of membership - the EU remains hesitant to embrace them. There is also an implied condition that a prospective member is not so large and different that existing members cannot accommodate it.⁸ Therefore the reasons for EU

⁷ Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Norway, Switzerland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania.

⁸ Northcott, p263.

hesitation have more to do with breaking the EU budget on Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), competition, and a westward flood of migrants than with significant CFSP concerns.

Northcott predicts that by the turn of the century or soon after, several countries will be admitted to the EU. These include Malta, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. After a few years, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia will follow them.⁹ Malta and Cyprus meet the requirements for admission but have political difficulties that have so far hindered membership. For Malta, the problem lies with its close ties with Libya; for Cyprus, it is the continuing Turkish conflict.

The "Visegrad-4" (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) are eager to secure EU membership as soon as possible. They see EU membership as providing military security in case of Russian resurgence, tremendous economic opportunities with the West, and cultural identification with Western and Central Europe. All four countries have significant problems to overcome, including conversion to market economies and income levels far below the EU average. Also, Slovakia remains dependent on declining

⁹ Northcott, p277

heavy industry, and Hungary and Poland have major agricultural sectors. Two studies have determined that the Visegrad-4 would more than double the cost of EU CAP and EU structural funds.¹⁰ Yet despite these problems, they are expected to be among the first to secure EU membership.

On July 16, 1997, the EU Commission released a statement that addressed the European Council's requests concerning membership applications.¹¹ *Agenda 2000* stated that negotiations with Cyprus and Malta are expected to begin six months after the IGC concludes. The length of time to complete admission will vary depending on each country's political, economic, and social condition. With respect to the CEEC's, the Commission has recommended that negotiations begin with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. For the remaining applicant countries, the Commission proposed using a pre accession strategy of:

- Formation of the Accession Partnerships;
- A clear work program and timetable for accession;

¹⁰ CAP study: K. Anderson & R. Tyers, *Implications of EC Expansion for European Agricultural Policies*. Center for Economic Policy Research, London, 1993. Structural Fund Study: T. Coucherne & others, 'Stable Money - Sound Finances', *European Economy* no. 53, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1993.

¹¹ EU Commission, *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe*. Press Release IP/97/660, DOC 97/9, Strasbourg, Brussels.

- Applicant familiarization with EU policies and procedures; and
- Participation in EU programs

The proposed strategy further specified that prospective countries must strengthen administrations, institutions, and investment in business and infrastructure. The Commission views expansion as a long-term process that will carry well into the year 2000. In the meantime applicants must continue taking positive steps towards the goal of EU membership.

With respect to CFSP, more members would make the decision-making process more difficult. Trying to mesh fifteen foreign policies is challenging enough without several more to slow the process. Additionally, with membership comes the responsibility of contributing to EU defense. With EU and possibly NATO members sitting on Russia's doorstep, this could be a particularly thorny issue for Russia.

NATO

All twenty-seven PfP countries are hopeful that they may some day come under the NATO aegis. As countries are admitted to NATO, what is the impact on the EU's CFSP? During a speech to the US-EU Conference in Washington in

May 1997, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that NATO expansion would "create an environment which, because it is more stable and peaceful, will be conducive to the EU's expansion eastward." The US view could put the EU in a slightly awkward position regarding EU admission. The addition of many new members is not necessarily a good thing for the EU. (Fortunately Talbott went on to complement the EU on its progress in expanding.) As was previously mentioned, EU expansion is hindered more by budget constraints than by security. As the EU figures out how to admit new members without going over budget, NATO expansion provides security to new members as they strive to enter the EU.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE US & THE CEECs

Two areas of the world are especially important to consider as the EU develops CFSP: the United States and Central and Eastern European Countries. The US plays an important role in European affairs via NATO and because of its role as a world power. As the EU expands eastward, Russian concerns must be considered in order to maintain a non-threatening process. Likewise the EU must proceed carefully as it accepts responsibility for new members.

The United States

During the second US-EU summit held in Washington, the US and the EU drew up the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA).

The NTA established four goals for the US-EU relationship:

1. "Promoting peace, stability, development, and democracy around the world;
2. Responding to global challenges;
3. Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic ties; and
4. 'Building bridges' across the Atlantic by encouraging closer communication between American and European business people, scientists, educators, and others."¹²

All four goals fall squarely in the purview of CFSP. The specifics of the agreement cover a broad spectrum of objectives from reconciliation in the Balkans to expanding the Internet. Of particular concern to EU security policy are the "Global Challenges," which include expanding counter-terrorism cooperation and enhancing cooperation on fighting international drug trafficking and organized crime. These are difficult goals to meet. Without a viable CFSP from which to work, the EU may once again have accepted a mission for which it is ill prepared.

¹² Senior Level Report to the US-EU Summit, *New Transatlantic Agenda: Senior Level Group Report to the US-EU Summit*. The Hague, Netherlands, May 28, 1997.

Central & Eastern European Countries

The security concerns associated with the CEEC's, while important, will likely be overshadowed by efforts to change and improve economic conditions. The process of economic restructuring has been difficult, causing setbacks that have not yet been corrected.

Agenda 2000 reaffirmed the criteria for the CEEC's established by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993:

- "The applicant country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- It must have a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
- It must have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union."

While the potential economic and political benefits are great, so are the risks. There is no shortage of conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, with war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, civil wars in Georgia and Moldova, and a fragile peace in the Balkans. When the EU accepts new members, it also accepts the possibility of getting caught up in their conflicts. Advocates hope that CEEC membership in the EU will function as the ECSC did in 1951, making it economically disastrous to go to war.

SUMMARY

The EU and its CFSP will undoubtedly be greatly challenged in the future. The days of bipolar confrontation have been supplanted by threats from all directions. The number of UN peacekeeping missions has risen dramatically since 1989 and shows no signs of decreasing. Eastern and Central Europeans, now released from decades of political repression, wage war against other countries and among themselves.

The current threats to security make a viable CFSP more critical to the EU than ever before. These threats are significant, but so is the potential of the EU to overcome them. The EU, the WEU and NATO are moving together towards a common position integrating the strengths of each institution. Eventually, the WEU will become part of the EU. As the defense component of the EU and not a "hinge" to NATO, it will further strengthen both organizations' ability to maintain peace.

Meanwhile the EU and the WEU are shouldering more of the European defense burden as the United States reduces its role in European affairs. NATO will continue to play a major role, but as the European pillar becomes stronger and

more credible, the EU/WEU will become the driving force behind European security.



Conclusion

"As the Union approaches the twenty-first century, it cannot afford to retreat into itself. Its economic weight demands that it play a commensurate political role in world affairs. The rest of the world has high expectations for the Union. There is no doubt that we have the resources and capability - but do we have the vision"?

Jacques Delors¹

As I consider the conclusion of this thesis I am drawn to the words of Jacques Delors. In the forward to Regelsberger's book, *Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Delors focuses on EU challenges to success in developing and implementing CFSP. In it he describes three important lessons learned from the Balkan crisis.

1. the need to develop the political will to function as a coherent political actor;
2. the need to create a planning and analysis capability at the European level;
3. the need to develop a military component to support our diplomacy.

The 1996 IGC and the culminating Amsterdam Treaty has addressed two of these points and resulted in positive steps towards improving CFSP effectiveness.

¹ Regelsberger, p viii

Article 17 (ex Article J.8) establishes a "High Representative" for CFSP affairs. This measure was recommended by most member states during the IGC to give CFSP a "face and a voice". It is hoped that the High Representative will act as a unifying force in maintaining a cohesive Union during times of crises. The Secretary General of the Council has been identified as the person to act as High Representative for CFSP (Article 26). His or her mission is:

"to assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties."

The new High Representative has a challenging if not impossible task. When the next significant crisis occurs, he will be the face and the voice most visibly responsible for maintaining Union cohesion. If the EU cannot maintain a united front, the military forces or diplomatic efforts of the EU will be greatly weakened. The Amsterdam Treaty does not specify or address any recourse for breaking ranks. Eventually there must be action taken when a member defies the treaty it has agreed to uphold. Now is likely too soon for such a measure, but each member must remain

faithful to its agreements or face the consequences. The EU cannot afford another abysmal and embarrassing CFSP performance. The next test for CFSP must be met with decisiveness and unwavering unity.

Although Delors's second point, the need for a planning and analysis capability, is not part of the Amsterdam Treaty, this capability is being developed. The WEU Planning Cell established in 1992 could be modified to fill the role of the European equivalent of the National Security Council (NSC) in the United States. It would be responsible for the overall strategy of CFSP as well as for crisis management. As the WEU strengthens its ties with the EU and NATO, the ability of the Planning Cell to provide an analysis capability will improve.

The WEU and the EU are one step closer to the controversial goal of integration. Under Article 17 (ex Article J.7), "The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union." Both the EU Commission and Parliament as well as many of the member states, support WEU/EU integration. This is a promising development for CFSP. Some of the problems of the EU's CFSP have been linked to the lack of a military

force to back its decisions. It is also important because it is seen as necessary progression towards greater EU integration. The treaty that founded the WEU expires in 1998. Perhaps the WEU will again be resurrected, as it becomes the force behind Union diplomacy.

Also under Article 17 is the addition of the Petersberg Tasks comprising humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management (including peacemaking). Most member states supported these inclusions. This is an important change to the treaty, because the Petersberg tasks commit the EU a greater international role, probably in support of the UN or NATO. While it is true that the EU has taken part in UN and NATO operations, such involvement has not been based on any treaty commitments. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks sets the stage for eventual WEU/EU integration. This will carry EU participation in military operations beyond domestic concerns to international affairs while, with NATO's support, building confidence in the EU's ability to implement CFSP.

The Amsterdam Treaty is a positive move towards a more effective CFSP. Recommendations from its member states has resulted in the IGC setting conditions for greater

integration and participation in international peacekeeping efforts. If the Treaty is ratified (as it should be), it will do three important things for CFSP. First, it gives CFSP an international personality and someone to maintain cohesiveness. Second, qualified majority voting will be more liberally applied. This will speed up the decision making process and may someday be used in more sensitive matters of defense. Third, integration of the WEU with the EU is a stated goal. The EU needs the military backing of the WEU and the support of NATO to back its diplomatic efforts.

The ability of the EU to administer CFSP improves each year. The Union continues to make progress in an area that is fraught with difficulty. Close to the heart of all Europeans, is national sovereignty. As Collins puts it, "To join any of these organizations requires giving up a little of a nations sovereignty. It is, however, more like a pooling of sovereignty than a zero sum game - the collective gets stronger and so do the nations."²

A common defense may never be a reality for the EU, but each year it moves towards a more viable CFSP.

² Collins, p. 7



Appendix I Treaty on European Union Title V

The Amsterdam Treaty PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

ARTICLE 11 (ex Article J.1)

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

ARTICLE 12 (ex Article J.2)

The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:

- defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
- deciding on common strategies;
- adopting joint actions;
- adopting common positions;
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

ARTICLE 13 (ex Article J.3)

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.

2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.

Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.

3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.

The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.

The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

ARTICLE 14 (ex Article J.4)

1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.

3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action.

5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.

6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.

7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

ARTICLE 15 (ex Article J.5)

The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

ARTICLE 16 (ex Article J.6)

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

ARTICLE 17 (ex Article J.7)

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

ARTICLE 18 (ex Article J.8)

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this Title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.
5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.

ARTICLE 19 (ex Article J.9)

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 20 (ex Article J.10)

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

ARTICLE 21 (ex Article J.11)

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

ARTICLE 22 (ex Article J.12)

1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

ARTICLE 23 (ex Article J.13)

1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.

2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
 - when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy;
 - when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.

This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.

ARTICLE 24 (ex Article J.14)

When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to them.

The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI.

ARTICLE 25 (ex Article J.15)

Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

ARTICLE 26 (ex Article J.16)

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.

ARTICLE 27 (ex Article J.17)

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

ARTICLE 28 (ex Article J.18)

1. Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities.



Appendix II

Western European Union: Members, Observers, Partners

Members

Belgium
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom

Observer

Austria
Denmark
Ireland
Finland
Sweden

Associate Member

Iceland
Norway
Turkey

Associate Partner

Czech Republic
Estonia
Lithuania
Latvia
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovakia

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Appendix IV Partnership for Peace Member States

Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.



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Affairs: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/index.html>

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Curriculum Vitae

Robert K. Rizzo

Captain Robert K. Rizzo is a Foreign Area Officer assigned to Indiana University. He was commissioned in the United States Army in June 1987 from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Captain Rizzo holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Geography from the University of New Hampshire (1983) and a Master of Arts degree in West European Studies from Indiana University (1997). Commissioned in the Infantry, Captain Rizzo's career spans ten years where he has performed in a variety of assignments.

Foreign Area Officer, Italian Army School of War, Civitavecchia, Italy, September 1995 - June 1996.

Infantry Company Commander, Alpha Company and Assistant Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, October 1992 - September 1994.

Company Executive Officer, C Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, May 1991 - January 1992.

Mortar Platoon Leader, Headquarters Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia and Southwest Asia, September 1989 - May 1991.

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Platoon Leader, 3rd Platoon, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, June 1988 - September 1989.

Captain Rizzo's military education includes: Defense Language Institute (Italian), Combined Arms Staff and Services School, Air Assault School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Mortar Platoon Leaders Course, Bradley Commander Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School.